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EDITORIAL.
CHANGE OF COMMENCEMENT DAY.
It has long been desired to secure a more
eligible time for the Law School Commencement, than that at which it has
hitherto taken place. Tile weather in Carlisle is apt to be torrid in the first week of
June, and Bosler Hall, exposed on roof
and two flanks to the sun, sometilnes becomes a veritable furnace in the afternoon.
The citizens of the town too are busy in
that part of the day, and can only with
inconvenience quit their avocations to witness commencement exercises. At length
the other portions of the program for the
week have been so arranged that Tuesday
evening may now be appropriated by the
Law School. The change will be in all
ways desirable. The temperature will be
better, and the audience will be larger.
Hon. Win. B. Hornblower, the distinguished orator, has signified his approval
of the hour selected, and all indications
foretell a very pleasant commencement.

THE SCHOOL.
A. J. Feight, post-grad., '97, has joined
the Governor's Troop.
We are glad to note a marked improvement in the condition of the reading-room
since the recent lecture on the subject.

Chas. E. Daniels, '98, has left school to
act as war correspondent of the Scranton
Truth during the continuance of the war
with Spain.
Among the students who have enlisted
in the National Guard of Pennsylvania
are Chas. E Shalters, '98, Chas. E. Horn,
'99, Clarence R. Gilliland, '99, Hugh Miller, post-grad. '97, Adair Herman, '98, G.
Fred. Vowinckle, '98, A. MX.Devall, 'N,8,
Miles H. Murr, '98, Garrett B. Stevens,
'99.

A large number of the students enjoyed
the most able and entertaining lecture
given by Hon. John Stewart, of Chainbersburg, on the subject, "Our Struggle
for a Continent," in the Second Presbyterian church, April 22d.
The regular bi-monthly examinations on
Real Property and Contracts were held recently.
Garrett B. Stevens, '98, was in Philadelphia April 30th.
Merkel Landis, '99, visited his brother,
at Flemington, N. J., recently.
The Juniors defeated the Seniors in all
interesting game of base-ball, played Saturday April 30th, the score being 27 to S.
The second game of the series will be
played'in a few days.
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Many of the Law School "braves" are
contemplating offering their services in
behalf of their country in addition to those
who are now on active duty.
Though not officially reported, itis pretty
generally known, that on a grassy plot in
Milford, Del., during their recent trip, the
members of the Glee Club defeated those
of the Orchestra in a game of foot-ball.
The score, 9 to 0, was the result of a forfeiture, caused by the old failing of the
Orchestra -discord.
The members of the Law School united
with the citizens of the tovn in giving a
great send-off to- the Gobin Guards on the
occasion of their departure for Camp Hastings. The procession of law students was
headed by John B. T. Caldwell, '98,
mounted marshal, followed by a .fife and
drum corps, and the body of students, under the command of G. Fred. Vowinckle,
'98.
The dramatic talent of the Law School
was called upon by the Gobin Guards,
the military company of Carlisle, to assist
them in their production of The Drummer
Boy of Shiloh. Those assisting were
Caldwell, Moser and Moyer, '98, and MeEwen, '00.
During the last month Dean Trickett has
issued the second volume of his" Borough
Laws." This work is a continuation of
his former edition on the same subject, and
embraces the law from 1893 to date. The
high character of his work is maintained
in this, his latest effort.
ORCHESTRA AND GLEE CLUB TRIP.
Again we burden the readers of the FoRUm with an account of a trip recently
taken by the Orchestra and Glee Club, bu b
the Law School members, Messrs. Snyder,
Berntheisel, Vowinckle, Hare, Devall.
Stevens, Sellers and Weeks report such a
magnificent time that we think it necessary to devote some little space to it. The
route, which included the towns of Steelton and Lancaster, Pa., Wilmington, Dover and Milford, Del., and Denton and
Baltimore, Md., seemed to be a happy one,
for at each place the boys were most enAt Dover, the
thusiastically received.

club sang before the Delaware Legislature
and was roundly applauded by that august
body. Receptions to the number of five
were lavished upon this exceptional organization and those at Wilmington, Milford and Baltimore are worthy of special
mention as showing to good advantage the
hospitality of this Dickinson locality. At
Wilmington ChiefJustice Lore entertained
the boys and in a most enthusiastic speech
sounded the praises of the Dickinson School
of Law and expressed his high appreciation
of the welcome which he received in Carlisle last Commencement.
At Milford, Mr. Holland, a trustee of the
College, amid festoons of red and white,
received the club in his beautiful home.
But at Baltimore! at Baltimore, there the
fellows say they had a great time and we
refuse to doubt it upon hearing that they
appeared before the students of the Woman's College exclusively and that after the
concert, at the reception given in the elaborately decorated gymnasium, they had
seven beautiful girls apiece. We decline
to report further.

ALUMNI PERSONALS.
If Dickinson College would be proud of
any alumnus, and if the Law School would
rejoice in the patronage of any one man,
it should be that distinguished citizen,
Chief Justice Lore. While he is greatly
honored in his native State, Delaware,
neither his name nor his enthusiasm can
be confined to any one locality, and the
character of his patriotism can be splendidly shown by the fact, that when, during the singing of the Star Spangled
Banner by the Glee Club in their concert
at Wilnington, the Stars and Stripes were
brought upon the stage, quick as a flash
Chief Justice Ldre rose to his feet, and in a
moment had the large audience cheering
for the Red, White and Blue. All honor
to this loyal son of Dickinson, who graduated half a century ago.
Julian C. Walker, !97, attended the reception given to the Orchestra and Glee
Club in Wilmington by Chief Justice Lore.
W i. H. Deweese, '93, who is States-Attorney for Caroline county, Maryland, is
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making rapid strides in his profession.
Not long ago one of the students of the
school was warmly welcomed at his offices
in Denton, Md., and after expressing his
great interest in the work of theschool, he
renewed his subscription for the FORUM
for the next two years-a most sensible
thing for an alumnus to do.
Joseph F. Biddle, '97, writes that he
expects to attend this year's Commencement.
Tie firm of Griswold and Somerville ('97)
reports gratifying progress. A recentletter
from them says that they "are getting
along so nicely that neither of us has yet
deserted the firm to go to fight Spain."
Somerville expects to attend Commencement.
DICKINSON SOCIETY
At a meeting of the Dickinson Society
last Friday evening, May 6th, Frank T.
Morrow was unanimously elected presiSpeeches were rendered by the
dent.
newly elected officer and ex-president
Miller.
After the business of the society, thelecturer of the evening, Dr. Himes, was introduced by Dr. Trickett. The lecturer had
for his subject "Expert Testimony." The
speaker dwelt principally upon the importance of having expert testimony in court
and gave very striking examples of its use.
At the close of the lecture a unanimous
vote of thanks was extended him by the
society for his highly entertaining lecture,
with the invitation to come again.
ALLISON SOCIETY
Dr. Geo. Edward Reed, President of the
Law School, delivered his first lecture on
the subject of "Forensic Oratory" before
the Society on Wednesday evening, May
4th. The Doctor discussed the principles
essential to effbctive speaking and how to
cultivate a good voice for public oratory.
He was listened to by a very attentive
audience. The lecture will be followed by
two more upon the same subject before the
term closes.

MOOT COURT.
FRANK HOWARD vs. HENRY
LAN GHAM.
Post-dated check- When corqider'd a
payment - Presentation- Laches-For
the court.
Assumpsit.
GEO. W. AUBREY and CHARLrS it.
WEEKS for the plaintiff.
1. A post-dated check is payable on or
at any time after the day of its date.-Matter of Brown, 2 Story, U. S. One day
after date is a reasonable time to present
it for payient.-Willis & Co. v. Finley,
173 Pa. 28; Loux v. Fox, 171 Pa 68; Bank
v. Well, 141 Pa. 461; Doherty v. Watson,
29 W. N. C. 32: Manic v. Brown, 4 Bing. N.
(. 266; Barclay v. Weaver, 19 Pa. 396;
Muncy v. Comm.,84 Pa. 464; Newark Bank
Co. v. Bank, 63 Pa. 404; Bank v. Broderick, 13 Wend. 133; Wharton on Contracts; Byle on Bills.
2. Until paid, a check is no payment.
It is only prima facrie evidence, and, if
dishonored, the creditor may resort to his
original claim.-Loux v. Fox. 171 Pa. 68;
Nace v. Hartman, 3 Sup. Ct. 203; Hart v.
Boller, 15 S. & R. 162; Weakly v. Bell, 9
Watts 280; McIntyre v. Kennedy, 29 Pa.
448; Eby v. Eby, 5 Pa. 440; Taylor v. Wilson, 52 Mass. 44; Small v. Mining Co., 99
Mass. 277; Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 171;
Thompson v. Bank, 82 N. Y. ]; People v.
Baker, 20 Wend. 602.
CHAS. G. MOYER and J. KiRK BOSLER
for the defendant.
1. It is the duty of holders of checks to
present the check at bank at least during
the day on which they received it. Not
having done so, plaintiffis chargeable with
negligence, and the consequelit loss.Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 177; Smith v.
Miller, 52 N. Y. 549; Bank v. Well, 141
Pa. 458; Champion v. Gordon, 70 Pa. 474:
Bank v. Broderick, 13 Wend. 133; Harker
v. Anderson, 21 Wend. 374; Bank v.
Leach, 52 N. Y. 350.
2. If a check, received in payment, is
not presented within reasonable time, and
the drawer is injured by the delay, the
check will operate as an absolute payment.
-Smith v. Miller, 43N. Y. 171; Hunter v.
Wetsell, 84 N9. Y. 549; McIntyre v. Kennedy, 29 Pa. 448; Smith v. Miller. 52 N.
Y. 549; Bank v. Well, 141 Pa. 458. "If
the securities are transferred for a debt
contracted at the time, the presumption is
that they are received in satisfaction of it."
-Lord Mansfield, in 1 Burr 452; McIntyre
v. Kennedy, 29 Pa. 451.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Howard, on Feb. 7, 1895, sold to Langham goods for $423, and Laugham gave to
Howard, at the time, a check, dated Feb.

THE FORUM .
11, 1895, for the amount, on his bankerthe First National Bank, of Philadelphia.
Howard, who kepr his account in the
Merchants' National Bank, of Philadelphia, for some reason did not deposit this
check there until Feb. 11th, just before the
close of banking hours, at 3 o'clock. On
the next day, Feb. 12th, at 2 P. i., the
Merchants' National Bank presented the
check for payment at the First National
Bank, but found that one hour before it
had closed its doors, being insolvent.
Langham had, when he drew his check,
$1,131 on deposit, of which $719 continued
on deposit at the time of the closing of the
doors. This isan action of assumpsit with
two counts; one on the check, and one on
the contract of sale.
By the sale, Laugham became indebted
to Howard in the sum of $423. He did
not pay in money, but he tendered a check
on his banker. This check might have
been received by Howard in satisfaction
of the debt arising from the sale, and, had
it been thus received, the action on its
non-payment by the bank, when presented
properly, would have been solely on the
check. But, the check of a debtor is presamed, until it is shown to have been received with a different intention, to be
received only as conditional payment; i. e.,
as payment if and when, the check itself
is paid. Should the check not be paid, the
original debt remains unsatisfied, and the
creditor can revert to it. and sue upon it.Wagner v. Crook, 167 Pa. 259; Kilpatrick
v. B. & L. Asso., 119 Pa. 30; Nace v. Hartman, 3 Superior 203. Thus, if a check
given to a lessor for rent due is not paid,
the lessor may distrain precisely as if the
check had not been given.-Loux v. Fox,
171 Pa. 68.
When a check is received by the creditor,
however, he tacitly agrees that he will take
proper steps to procure payment of it from
the depository bank, and that if he shall
fail therein, and the fund in the bank
should, in consequence, be lost to the
debtor, the check shall become payment.
After the depositor has given a check, he
is bound to permit so much of his deposit
to remain as may be necessary to pay the
check. This loss of control by him makes
diligence in presentment of the check incumbent on the payee, and visits on him
the damage that would follow the insol-

vency of the bank arising after the time
for proper presentment had passed, and
before such presentment. - Wagner v.
Crook, 167 Pa. 259; Kilpatrick v. B. & L.
Asso., 119 Pa. 30. On such a loss there
could be no recovery, either upon the check
-National State Bank v. Weil, 141 Pa.
457; Willis v. Finley, 173 Pa. 28; or upon
the original transaction.- Loux v. Fox,
171 Pa. 68.
When the Langham check was presented for payment to the First National
Bank, it had, one hour previously, closed
its doors. The check was not paid, and
Langham lost his deposit of $719, $423 of
which was awaiting the check. Did this
loss arise from the want of due diligence
on the part of Howard? The payee of a
check is not obliged to present it to the
depository bank on the day on which hereceives it, whether there is or is not time
during that day to present it.-2 Daniel,
Negot. Inst. 618. "The ruletobe adopted,"
said Lord Ellenborough, "must be a rule
of convenience; and it seems to me
to be convenient and reasonable that
checks received in the course of one day
should be presented the next."-Rickford
v. Ridge, 2 Camp. 537. This is the rule in
Pennsylvania.-National State Bank v.
Weil, 141 Pa. 457. The payee of a check
is not required to present the check in person to the depository bank. He may deposit it with his own bank, and that bank
may present it to the bank on which it is
drawn. In that case the payee may wait
until the day following that on which he
receives it, and then deposit the check in
his own bank, and this bank may wait
until the next day before presenting it for
payment. There will be no default until
the expiration of that day withoutpresentment.-Willis v. Finley, 173 Pa. 28; Loux
v. Fox, 171 Pa. 68.
But the check given by Langham was a
post-dated check. Though delivered on
Feb. 7th, it was dated Feb. 11th. Such
checks are not unusual, and they are not
payable until the day of their date.-2
Daniel, Negot. Inst. 607. In other respects
they have the qualities of the ordinary
check. They are without grace, and they
are not to be presented for acceptance before payment.- Champion v. Gordon, 70
Pa. 74. It is contended that the same
time after maturity of such a check is to
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be allowed for presenting it as is allowed
IN RE PEPPER & CO.
for presenting the ordinary check. The
object of the legal rule is to secure as Partnership credilors-Creditorsof individual partner-Assignment for crediprompt a presentment as is reasonably
tots-Auditor'sreport.
convenient. To require a bank, or other
holder of a check, to present it on the day
Exceptions to auditor's report.
of its receipt would be to keep it or him
FREDERICK C. MILLER and J. B. T.
"iin continual fever," says Lord EllenborCALDWELL for exceptants.
ough-Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Camp. 537.
Appleton must first resort to the indiFor this reason, presentment on the day vidual fund.-Sedgwick's Appeal, 70 Pa.
of receipt is not exacted. In the case of 217; McCormick's Appeal, 55 Pa. 2.52;
Houseal & Smith's Appeal, 45 Pa. 484;
the ordinary check, the time of payable- Black's Appeal, 44 Pa. 503; Heckman et
ness is identical with that of delivery. at. v. Messinger, 49 Pa. 465.
An assignment of joint property for the
The check cannot be presented until it is
in the possession of the payee, and a reason- creditors of the assignors will inure to the
benefit of the joint creditors first.-Trickett
able time is allowed him from the moment
on Assignments, p. 94; Houseal's Appeal,
of his acquiring such possession. But, supra; Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. 76.
As against creditors, a copartnership canwhen the possession precedes by a day, or
assume the individual liabilities of one
days, the time of payment, why should the not
of its members.-Boodbeck's Appeal, 163
permissible delay of presentment date from
Pa. 171; North Pa. Coal Co.'s Appeal, 45
the maturity instead of the delivery? A Pa. 181.
post-dated check is an implied promise to
ROBERT B. STUCKER and ADAIR HERpay on the (late, if the bank does not. A MAN for the auditor's report.
There is a presumption of law that, in
promissory note, payable on a future day,
must be presented on the day of its ma- the absence of evidence, a loan is made
upon the credit ot the partnership busiturity, in order to make the endorser's lia- ness.-Mifflin v. Smith, 17 S. & R. 165;
bility absolute.-1 Daniels. Negot. Inst. Hogg v. Orgill, 34 Pa. 349; Haldeman &
579. We see no reason why Howard, hav- Grubb v. Bank of Middletown, 28 Pa. 440.
If one party signs and seals an instruing the check in his hands on Feb. 7th,
ment in the firm's name, and the other
should not be required to have deposited partner is present assenting to it, he is as
it with his own bank not later than the much bound as if be had signed and sealed.
8th, 9th or 10th, so that that bank might -Fichthorne v. Boye, 5 V. 159; Miller v.
Gas Works, 176 Pa. 76; Kramer v. Dinshave presented it on the 11th.
more, 152 Pa. 264; Foster v. Andrews, 2 P.
At the trial we allowed the jury to say & W. 160.
whether the check had been presented
The presumption of law is that an audiwith reasonable expeditiousness, and the tor's report is correct; and it will not be set
jury, finding that it had been so presented, aside except for flagrant error.-Burrough's Appeal, 26 Pa. 264; Mengh's Apreturned a verdict for the plaintiff. We peal, 7 Harris 222; Landis et al. v. Scott,
think the jury in error in its conclusion,
32 Pa. 499.
and also that we improperly submitted to
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
it what was a question of law. It is for
the court to determine what is a reasonaWilliam Mustard and John Pepper
ble time for the presentment of a check, were partners in the business of making
when the facts are ascertained.-Loux v. and selling carriages, under the firm name
Fox, 171 Pa. 68; Rosenthal v. Ehrlicher, of Pepper & Co. For material bought,
154 Pa. 396; National State Bank v. Well, they became indebted to Samuel Bacon,
141 Pa. 457; Willis v. Finley, 173 Pa. 28.
$300; to Philip Shepard, $400; and to Win.
We should have advised the jury that Sherman, $500. John Pepper also carried
Howard waited unreasonably long in pre- on a planing-mill, and in that business
. nting the check, and, as it was not con- bought material of Augustus Blaine, $2'0;
tested that it would have been paid had it
of Joseph Andrews, $340; and of Adam
been presented the day before, that the Avery, $175. lie also bought material of
failure to collect it was the result of his David Appleton, $450. In the transaction,
procrastination. The verdict must be set
however, he professed to act as the firm of
a-Ride, and a new trial granted.
Pepper & Co., and the note he gave was
signed by him Pepper & Co. in the pres-
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ence and with the assent of Mu4stard. It
was the purpose of Mustard simply to become surety for Pepper, and this was the
mode adopted. Appleton, however, supposed that he was selling the lumber to
Pepper & Co. The firm of Pepper & Co.
and Pepper became embarrassed, and assigned their properties to Daniel Keller, in
trust for creditors. All other creditors
have been satisfied, except those abbve
mentioned, without objection. Ofthe firm
property there remains a balance of $1,050;
and of Pepper's individual property a balance of $600. The auditor appointed to
distribute has made the following distribution :
From the property of Pepper & Co. he
awarded
To David Appleton .................... $286 36
To Samuel Bacon ...................... 190 91
To Philip Shepard .................... 254 55
To William Sherman ................ 318 18
$1,050 00
From the property of John Pepper he
awarded
To A. Blaine .......................... $216 15
To J. Andrews .......................... 253 42
To A. Avery ............................. 130 43
$600 00

Bacon,Shepard and Sherman except that
Appleton ought not to have been paid out
of the firm fund. Appleton excepts that
he ought to have been paid out of both
firi and individual fund.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The first question with which we have
to deal is, is David Appleton entitled to
claim out of the fund raised by the sale of
the property of Pepper & Co. ?
The members of a firm have a right that
its property shall be appropriated to the
payment of its debts. They are each liable
for such debts, and if the creditor of one
could seize any portion of the common
property, he Would increase the burden
and risk on the other partners, with. respect to partnership debts. The rule is
well established, therefore, that when firm
property is assigned for the benefit of creditors, the creditors of the individual partners can take none of the proceeds until all
th firm creditors are paid.-Trickett, Assiguments, 94; Houseal's Appeal, 45 Pa.
484; Black's Appeal, 44 Pa. 503; Gallagher's

Appeal, 114 Pa. 353. Is Appleton a creditor of the firm?
Pepper & Co. was an existing firm, of
which Pepper and Mustard were the'members. The former bought material, such
as could be used in the business of the
firm, of Appleton, professing to act, and
believed by Appleton to be acting, for the
firm. He executed the firm's note for the
purchase, with the assent of Mustard.
This made Appleton incontestably a creditor of the firm. He gave no credit to
Pepper, as an individual. .It could not
matter that the intention of Pepper
and Mustard was that the material
should be Pepper's. With such object or
intention of the firm, Appleton had no
concern, as, indeed, he was entirely ignoraut of it.
Pepper would have had no right, as
against his non-consenting partner, to
issue a firm note in payment of material
sold to him as an individual -McNaughton's Appeal, 101 Pa. 550; James v. Vanzandt, 163 Pa. 171; and firm creditors
might successfully object to the payment
of it out of the joint assets. There are
dicta to the effect that the debt of a partner, for which the firm is not legally or
morally responsible, could not be assumed,
with the consent of all the partners, by the
firm, so as to admit the holder of the debt
to share with firm creditors in the distribution of its effects-James v. Vanzandt,
163 Pa. 171; Walker v. Marine National
Bank, 98 Pa. 574; Siegelv. Chidsey, 28 Pa.
279; although such dicta are inconsistent
with the often-avowed principle that the
right of creditors to preference with respect
to the firm's assets dependson the equities
between the partners- Gallagher's Appeal,
114 Pa. 3.53; Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. 76;
Himmelreich v. Shaffer, 182 Pa. 201; for it
is quite plain that if the partners consent
to the issue of a firm obligation for the advantage of one of their number, the payment of that obligation out of the joint
assets can do them no wrong. In Siegel
v. Chidsey, 28 Pa. 279, it had been said by
Woodward J., of a firm note issued to a
creditor in lieu of one of a partner formerly
held by him, "Nor could it be a fraud on
partnership creditors, for they have no lien
on partnership effects, and whatever equities are available to them must be worked
out through the partners."
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However this may be, Pepper had a
right to contract for his firm. He professed
to contract for it. He issued the firm note.
His partner assented. Appleton, therefore, was a creditor. He is not concerned
with any arrangements made by the partners inter se. If they chnse to permit one
of their number to appre.priate the material sold to them, such appropriation could
not impair his right of payment.
The second question raised by the exceptions to the auditor's report concerns
the right of Appleton to share in the proceeds of the individual estate of John
Pepper. The correlative of the rule that
firm creditors must be first paid out of firm
assets is the rule that creditors of the individual partners must be first paid out of
their individual assets. Appleton can receive anything from the property of John
Pepper only if he is the creditor of Pepper.
A man may be both the creditor of an individual and of the firm of which he is a
member.-17 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1201 f
Collyer, Part., 1451. Appleton's sale might
have been to Pepper, Pepper & Co. becoming collateral security,simultaneously with
the sale, or subsequently. Insuch a case,
a claim could have been made on both the
partnership and the individual assets.
But, the sale was to the firm. The security
taken was the firm's note. No several
liability of Pepper was procured by Appleton. He had no right, therefore, to receive
anything from Pepper's individual estate,
because it was insufficient to pay his creditors.
We see no error in the findings of the
auditor. Tie exceptions to his report are
dismissed, and the report is confirmed.
Distribution will be made in accordance
therewith.
CHARLES SMITH vs. ARUNDEL
COFFEY.
Shelley's Case- Will-Codicil-InRule in.
tention of testator.
Bill in Equity.
j. HARvEY LINE and THOMrAs B. PEPPEn for the plaintiffs.

The intention of the testator is the primary and fundamental guide in the interpretation of a will. -Tiedman on R. P.,
902 & 903; Malcolm v. *Malcolm, 3 Cush.
472; Bowers v. Porter, 4 Pick. 188; Wright's

Appeal, 89 Pa. 67; Baker and Wheeler's
Appeal, 115 Pa. 590. The word "heirs"
may be construed to be a word of purchase
rather than one of limitation, if it was the
intention of the testator to use it in that
sense.-Tiedman on R. P. p. 903; Guthrie's
Appeal, 37 Pa. 9; Chew's Appeal. 37 Pa.
23.
The testator may restrain the generality
of the former devise and convert what
would otherwise be a fee simple into an inferior estate.-Haldemnan v. Ialdeman, 40
Pa. 29; Shalters v. Ladd, 141 Pa. 349.
RUEL U. CAPIVELL and MARTIN F.
HERR for defendants.
The rule in Shelley's Case applies here.
Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 9; Kepple's Appeal, 53 Pa. 211; Sheeley v. Niedhammer;
182 Pa. 163; Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 335;
Potts v. Kline, 174 Pa. 513; Potts' Appeal,
30 Pa. 170; Potts v. Griesemer, 174 Pa. 516;
Dove v. Torr, 128 Mass. 38; IHaldeman v.
Haldeman, 40 Pa. 29.
The words "lawful heirs" and "heirs"
are presumed by law to be used in their
legal sense.-Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 9;
Cockin's Appeal, Ill Pa. 26; Criswell's Appeal, 41 Pa. 288.A devise to one for life with remainder
to his heirs and legal representatives is a
fee simple.--McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa.
92; Steiner v. Kalb, 57 Pa. 123; Nice's App.
50 Pa. 143.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Jacob Smith made a will in which he
devised to "my seven children, four of
which are sons, * * * all of my real estate to be divided in eleven shares equal in
value. To my son John Smith and to his
lawful heirs I will and bequeath two
shares." He subsequently acquired other
real estate, and made a codicil, in which he
says, "I hereby give and bequeath unto my
children hereinbefore named all the real
estate that, I am now seized of as well as
all other real estate that I may hereafter
purchase or become seized of at my decease.
And it is also my desire and intention in
this my last will and testament, not to invest the fee simple of my real estate in any
said sons or daughters, my said several
sons, towit John * * * cannot dispose
of or alienate as well as my daughters any
part or parcel of real estate, all of which is
to descend to their respective heirs and legal representatives."
John Smith having conveyed one of the
tracts thus devised to him to Arundel Coffey, his heirs and assigns, has since died,
and his son Charles Smith brings this ejectment against Coffey.
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The theory on which the plaintiff brings
this action is, that under the will of his
grandfather, his father acquired but a life
estate. The original devise was to "John
Smith and to his heirs." H=ad these words
not been qualified by the codicil, John
Smith would certainly have obtained a fee,
and his son could not maintain this action
against his grantee.
1las the codicil
changed the nature of the estate conferred
on John Smith?
The testator's intention seems quite clear.
It was his IIdesire and intention" not to
invest the fee simple of his land in John or
any other child. He expressly denies to
them the power to alienate any part of the
land, and he directs that all of it shall descend to their respective heirs. Generally,
the courts endeavor to carry out the intention of the testator. When the statute of
wills authorized testamentary dispositions
of land,its object was to permit the decedent
to regulate the transmission of it. This
concession having been made to him, the
primary aim of the courts became that of
interpretation. But difficulties soon presented themselves. Many wills were of
doubtful signification. Of two or more in_
tentions of the testator, some were found
to be incompatible with each other. Arrangements of estates were devised wlich
a sound public policy condemns. Various
rules were from time to time evolved which
do not seek to ascertain, but to check and
override the testamentary purpose. The
rule against perpetuities is one of these.
The rule in Shelley's Case is another.
The object of the rule in Shelley's Ca.e
is not to learn what the will of the testator
was, but to determine what should result
when his will in certain respects was ascertained. The "common result of the application of the rule in Shelley's Case," says
Williams J., is to defeat the intention of
the testator.-Sheely v. Neidhammer, 182
Pa. 163; Auman v. Auman, 21 Pa. 343 (a
deed); Grimes v. Shirk, 169 Pa. 74. When
the testator intends (1) to give a life estate
only to A, and (2) the remainder in fee to
any person whatever who shall at his death
be the heir of his body, or his heir, that
rule refuses to execute the second intention
and enlarges the estate that would otherwise vest in A into a fee tail or a fee simple.
Do then the conditions exist upon which
the rule in Shelley's Case operates?

The testator has in the will given the
land to John and his heirs. In the codicil,
he says his intention is not that he shall
have a fee simple, but an estate which he
cannot aliene, and which will descend to
his heirs. In short, he intends John to
have a life estate and no more, and he intends the remainder to descend on John's
heirs. How are we to understand the word
"heirs"? It is a technical word, and is
almost invariably employed and interpreted in that sense. It is presumed to
have that sense unless some other is unequivocally indicated il the will.-Guthrie's
Appeal, 37 Pa. 9; Sheely v. Neidhammer,
182 Pa. 163; Cockin's Appeal, 111 Pa. 26;
Criswell's Appeal, 41 Pa. 288. Nothing
appears in Smith's will to influence the
interpretation of this word. He did not
meani the children of John. Hemeantthe
heirs of John. If John left surviving him
children, they would be his heirs. But if
he left of lineal relatives only grandchildren
of great-grandchildren, these would be his
heirs. If he left no lineal relatives, but
brothers or sisters, or nephews or nieces,
these would be his heirs. Heintended that
the remainder, after John's death, should
pass to whoever should be his heir. The
contemplated remaindermen were therefore not the root of a new succession. They
were themselves branches from the root
John.-Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 9.
Were this not already clear, it would become so by means of the word "descend."
The testator directs that the land is "to descend to their [his children's] respective
heirs and legal representatives." The word
descend denotes the vesting of an estate by
operation of law in the heirs. Potts v.
Kline, 174 Pa. 513; Haldeman v. Haldeman, 40 Pa. E9. Land passes to an heir,
qua heir, by descent. To any one else, it
passes by purchase. It is beyond all question, we think, that Jacob Smith intended
precisely such persons as would be John's
heirs to take the land devised to him at
his death.
The direction that John "cannot dispose
of or alienate" the land is perhaps an indication that the testator intended him to
take but a life estate. That intention is
quite manifest, independently of such provision. We have already seen that it is
not the objeet of the rule in Shelley's Case
to find out and execute the whole will of
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sold the logs to Jones. Robinson counted
and marked the end of every log with a
stroke of lead pencil. After the logs were
counted, Robinson signed a bill of sale,
transferring the logs to Jones, and .Jones
gave a receipt for the price of the logs as
crediton thejudgment held by him against
Robinson. The bargain took place upon
the land, in view of the logs. It was consumuated, and they left before 5 o'clock
P. r. same day. At 5 o'clock P. ii. same
(lay Thompson issued an execution under
his judgment against Robinson, and the
sheriff levied upon the same logs as the
property of Robinson. At the saleThompson bought them, and took possession.
Jones brought replevin for the logs. On
the trial the judge instructed the jury that
if they found the facts as stated above, and
that all practicable change of possession
JOHN JONES vs. WM. THOMPSON.
had taken place when the Thompson exeReplevin-Sale ofpersonalproperty to one cution issued, Jones had title to the logs
judgment creditor-Execution on same under the purchase from Robinson. Verprope;r by the other judgqment creditor.
dict for Jones. Thompson asks for a new
trial, for the reason that the above instrucReplevin. Motion for new trial.
tion to the jury was error.
CLEON N. BERNT.IrEISEI, and GEo. W.
BETSON in support of the motion.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
CHAS. E. DANIELS and J. AUSTIN SULLIVAN contra.
The logs were at one time the property
There was sufficient change of possession
of Paul Robinson. The parties to this acto constitute a good delivery as against the
tion respectively claim them, the plaintiff
rights of other creditors.-Ayers v Mcvirtue of a private sale, and the defendin
Candless, 147 Pa. 149; Zeigler & Co. v.
ant in virtue of an execution sale. The priHendrick, 106 Pa. 82; Chase v. Ralston et
al., 30 Pa. 531; Williams & ('o. v. Rolling
vate sale preceded the execution sale.
Mill Co 174 Pa. 299; Cessna v. Minick et
What is there to invalidate it, as respects
Garretson
v.
Hackenberg,
al., 113 a. 70;
the latter?
144 Pa. 107; MeKibbin v. Martin, 64 Pa.
John Jones was a judgment creditor of
352; Long v. Knapp, 54 Pa. 514.
The purchase was in good faith, and for
Robinson. The consideration of the sale to
a valuable consideration; it was followed
him was his satisfaction, to the extent of
by acts intended to transfer possession and
the price, of this judgment. As between
title, and the vendee assumed such control
them, the judgment is conclusive that the
as indicated ownership. Therefore, the
delivery, as matter of law, was sufficient.
debt, represented by it, existed. Such sale
-Caseq cited above.
therefore passed the ownership of Robinson
Replevin may be maintained by proving
over to Jones.
either a general or special property in the
But, while a sale may be good between
plaintiff, together with his right of immediate possession.-R. R. Co. v. Ellsey, 85
the immediate parties to it, it may be void
Pa. 283; Strong, Deemer & Co. v. Dinning,
as to others. The person who contests the
175 Pa. 586.
sale to Jones is William Thompson, all exSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
ecution creditor and a'purchaser. Is the
Paul Robinson owned a piece of timber
sale to Jones voidable by Thompson?
It was for a substantial consideration
land. He cut the timber into saw logs,
and is not therefore voidable because graand let it lie in the manner in which it
tuitous. The credit ol the judgment is a
was cut. John Jones and Win. Thompson
sufficient price for thelogs. A debtor may
were judgment creditors of Robinson. On
transfer his chattels to his creditor, effectSeptember 1, 1897, at I o'clock P. At., Robinson went with Jones upon the land and ively as against other creditors, if the price

the testator, but having found out that he
irtends to give a lip estate to A, and a remainder to the heirs of A, to withdraw all
interest from the heirs, and to bestow itoh
A. If the object was to give John a fee,
but to deprive him of the power to sell the
land, this again is an object which the law
will frustrate. Such clogs on alienation
are not tolerated.-Kopple's Appeal, 53 Pa.
211; Sheely v. Neidhanimer, 182 Pa. 163;
McIntyre v. McIntyre, 123 Pa. 329.
John Smith therefore acquired a fee siniple under his father's will.* This fee passed
by his deed to Arundel Coffey, and when
he died, there was no estate in him to descend upon the plaintiff, Charles Smith.
On the casestated therefore, judgment will
be entered for the defendant.
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at which they are transferred is fair, and
there is no malaftdes.-Garretsonv. Hackenberg, 144 Pa. 107; Zeigler v. Handrick,
106 Pa. 87; Williams v. Rolling Mill Co.,
174 Pa. 299.
Even though this consideration was adequate, if the sale was made in order to defraud or delay Thompson, it would be voidable by him. But there was no such purpose. Its object was to pay Jones. It is too
well known that one of several creditors can
accept payment from the debtor without
risking the attachment or seizure of the
money or chattels received by him by other
creditors, to need citation of authority.
Preference of one creditor over another by
the debtor is one of the most constantly
recurring phenomena of business transactions. To prohibit it would be indeed to
work a profound and far-reaching revolution.
But, besides the absence of any oblique
motive towards other creditors, the law in
many cases requires a delivery of the possession of the thing sold to the vendee.
Without such delivery the sale, as respects
the parties, may be effectual. The ownership may pass, if they intend, from the
seller to the buyer.-Hetrick v. Campbell,
14 Pa. 263; Boyle v. Rankin, 22 Pa. 168;
Janney v. Howard, 150 Pa. 339; Croft v.
Jennings, 173 Pa. 216. But, in order to
apprise creditors of the vendor, or subsequent purchasers of the same chattel from
him, that he has ceased to be its owner, it
is usually necessary that it should pass
from his possession to the purchaser. Although the parties intended no fraud upon
others in the sale, the omission to change
the possession, because of its tendency to
deceive later purchasers or creditors, has
the effect of fraud-Stephens v. Gifford,
137 Pa. 219; McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa.
414; Janney v. Howard, 150 Pa. 339; except as to such later purchasers as were
aware of the earlier sale-Croft v. Jennings, 173 Pa. 216.
It is alleged by Thompson that the sale
to Jones not beiog agcompanied by a
change of the possession, was in this sense
fraudulent as to him, and void. In determining what change of possession is necessary, regard must be had to the relations
of the parties, the nature, use and situation
of the property.-Goddard v. Weil, 165 Pa.
419; Renninger v. Spatz, 128. Pa. 524.

There may be an effective change of possession without a change of the situation
of the chattel.-Garretson v. Hackenberg,
144 Pa. 107; Pre,:sel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263;
McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414; Ayers v.
McCandless, 147 Pa. 49; Cessnav. Minick,
113 Pa. 70. The logs were distinguished
and marked. Then a bill of sale of them
was executed. A receipt for a paymenton
the judgment was given to Robinson. It
is quite clear that there was here all the
delivery necessary to identify the logs and
to pass the ownership of them to Jones.
There was no other change of pgssession.
The logs continued to be where they had
been. They were not on the land of Jones,
as they were in Garretson v. Hackenberg,
144 Pa. 107, but on that of Robinson. They
were not even marked with the name of
Jones, or with any mark that could ap:
prise others that they were his, as in Ayers
v. McCandless, 147 Pa. 49.
But a very short interval of time lay between the completion of the sale and the
issue of theft. fa. The parties repaired to
the land where the logs were, at I P. iu.
Precisely when the negotiation was completed does not appear. They left before
5 o'clock. At 5 o'clock the execution was
issued. It is evident that a very short
time intervened, a time too short for the
removal of the heavy timber which was
the subject of the sale. Such change of
possession as is reasonably practicable is all
that is required.-Mc~lure v. Forney, 107
Pa. 414. It would be unreasonable to say
that fifteen minutes after a sale of a heavy
and bulky article, it can be avoided by a
ft. fa. because within that time the article
has not been hauled away, or because conspicuous symbol of a transfer has not been
displayed. We think that the evidence
was sufficient to justify the jury in inferring that all the change of possession of
which the property was susceptible in thetime that elapsed before the issue of theft.
fa. had taken place. As they did so infer,
it followed that the logs had become the
property of Jones when the Thompson
writ came to the hands of the sheriff.
There was no misdirection for which a new
trial should be awarded.
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RICHARD HASTINGS vs. JOSIAH
PROCTOR.
Impairment of the mind of a grantorOpinion of a non-expert- Where part of
an offer is incompetent, court may reject
the whole.
Bill in equity.
FRANCIS LAFFERTY and PAUL J.
SCHMIDT for the plaintiff.
1. A non-expert may testify to facts
within her knowledge regarding the mental condition of a grantor. Also, after
stating such facts, may give her opinion
based thereon.-Bank v. Wierback, 106
Pa. 37; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa. 401;
Barker v. Comins, 110 TMass. 477; McKee
v. Nelson, 4 Cowen 355; Ins. Co. v. Rodel,
95 U. S.239; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. 342;
Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Pa. 117.
2. Opinion of a duly qualified expert is
always admissible.-Kershaw v. Wright,
115 Mass. 361.
GABRIEL H. MOYER and SYLVESTER B.
SADLER for the defendant.

1. The opinions of non-experts as to capacity are inadmissible, until they have
stated facts from which the weight of their
opinion may be determined.-Eleessor v.
Elcessor, 146 Pa. 359; Doran v. McConlogue, 150 Pa. 98; Burnham v. Sherwood,
14 Atlan. 715; Bank v. Wierback 12 W.
N. C. 150; Stokes v. Miller, 10 W. N. C.
241; Clark v. Clark, 168 Mass. 52.
2. Evidence should be confined to incacity at time of execution.- Cummins v.
urlbutt, 92 Pa. 165; Stevensv. Vancleve,
4 Wash. C. C. 21,8; Stine v. Sherk, 1 W.
& S., 195; Irwin v. Shoemaker, 8 W. & S.
75; Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Pa. 119.
3. The testimony as to the recent mental
state of the plaintiff by alienists and physicians is incompetent and irrelevant, and
one portion of the offer being incompetent,
the court is not bound to separate the good
from the bad, and the whole should be refused.-Keeler Co. v. Schott, 1 Superior
Court 458.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On February 3, 1891, Hastings executed
a deed to Proctor for a tract of land. He
was then 87 years old, his sight imperfect
and his mind not very good. Proctor had
been a son-in-law, having married thirty
years before a daughter of Hastings, who
had been dead for ten years. Intimate relations between Hastings and Proctor had
subsisted since the marriage of the latter,
and in late years the latter had at Hastings'
request attended to the more important
pieces of business of the former. The present bill was filed by Hastings to compel
Proctor to deliver back the deed to Hast-

ings and to declare it void. Hastings alleges that he was told he was signing a
contract of lease which he was about entering into with one Jones, for a certain
mill property and that he had never talked
with Proctor about a conveyance of the
land covered by the deed of February 3,
1891 and that Proctor's act was entirely
fraudulent. A sister of Hastings was tendered as a witness at the trial in 1897 to
testify that she had been in constant communication with him since his childhood;
that his mind had shown serious impairment in the last ten years; that this impairment was manifest in various acts and
peculiarities which she would describe;
and that it was now in the same condition
as in 1891. Counsel stating that he would
follow the witness with other expert alienists and physicians who had observed
Hastings recently and would describe his
recent mental state.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The bill filed by Hastings does not allege
insanity at the time of making the conveyance to Proctor. The facts that impair that
conveyance are stated in it to be the misrepresentation by Proctor of the character
of the instrument presented by him to
Hastings for execution, and the abuse by
the former of the confidence of the latter.
The reliance on Proctor's information as to
the nature of the instrument is explained
by the comparative blindness of Hastings.
The attempt to show mental impairment
of the latter is in order to explain how he
could have been imposed on by Proctor.
The witness is offered to show that she
has been in constant communication with
him since childhood, that for the last ten
years his mind has been seriously impaired
and that this impairment has manifested
itself in various acts and peculiarities,
which she will describe.
Serious impairment means either (1) a
serious reduction of mental power from
Hastings' former standard or (2) a reduction of it below the normal or ordinary
standard. May the witness testify to it
in the former sense? The answer to this
is the answer to two other questions. Can
the witness form an opinion as to the mental state at each of two points of time, and
can he compare these states and pronounce
of the later that it is inferior to the former?
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A, who is in contact with X, learns the
qualities of his mind as readily as of his
features. He knows whether X is quick
or slow of apprehension, has a good or a
bad memory, is patient or not, irascible or
not, affectionate or not, confiding or suspicious, of good or bad reasoning power. A
knows how X compares in these respects
with Y. If he continues in relation with
X through the various stages of his life, he
may know how'in one stage the mental
faculties compare with what they were in
another stage. There can be no doubt
that the sister is competent to consider the
present mental power of Hastings in conjunction with his past power, and to say
that he has suffered a serious impairment
of it.-Commonwealth v. Brayman, 136
Mass. 438; Clark v. Clark. 168 Mass. 523.
But, the design of the testimony proposed seems to be to show that the mental
power of Hastings is seriously below the
ordinary or normal, that if he is not insane,
he is intellectually feeble in comparison
with the average man. Is the witness
competent to give such evidence? She is
not a n alienist nor an expert of any kind.
A non-expert witness is not permitted to
say that a person is insane unless he
has observed and described certain facts
which are so characteristic of insanity
that they tend to prove it.-First National Bank v. Wirebach, 106 Pa. 37; Dickinsonv. Dickinson, 61 Pa. 401; Stokes v.
Miller, 10 W. N. 0. 241; Dean v. Fuller, 40
Pa. 478; Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa. 216; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. 342. The witness on
the stand offers to state acts and peculiarities of Hastings. They may be of such a
nature as to warrant the inference of imbecility or mental feebleness. If they are, it
will not be error to allow her to state that
hismindhas "shown serious impairment."
Irish v. Smith, 8 S. & R. 573. A witness
may say of a person that from his appearance he believes him to be of sound mind,
Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Pa. 117; or, after
describing (though very vaguely) the appearance, that he believes him to be
childish."1-8 S. & R. 573.
The deed to Proctor was executed on
February 3, 1891. Hastings' mental condition at any other time is irrelevant, exce)t in so far as it tends to disclose the condition on that day.-First Nat. Bank v.
Wirebach, 106 Pa. 37. Weakness of mind

a short time before February 3, 1891, e. g.,
a day before, would justify the inference
that it continued on that day.-First Nat.
Bank v. Wirebach, 12 W. N. C. 150. Is it
proposed to show the state of the grantor's
mind before Feb. 3, 1891? The witness is
to state, according to the offer, that there
has been serious impairment in the last ten
years. Seven of those years have succeeded that date.
Impairment during
these seven would be impairment "in the
last ten years." But did any of the acts
and peculiarities to which the witness is to
testify occur before February 3, 1891? It
does not so appear. As the opinion concerning the mental state is admissible only
if facts are stated which reasonably suggest
insanity, imbecility or mental weakness,
it is incumbent on the proponent to show
clearly that the acts to be proven precededthe execution of the deed to Proctor. Otherwise no opinion of the witness as to the
grantor's state before and at that time will
be admissible.
The offer proposes also to show the grantor's condition down to the time of trial in
March, 1898; that is for the period-of seven
years after the execution of the deed. In
what light is this relevant? An insanity
shortly after an occurrence may be of such
a nature as to indicate that it had not come
suddenly and recently, and if that is so,
the inference might properly be drawn
that it had existed at the time of the occurrence. In Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23
Pa. 117, it was intimated that an insanity
two years after the event would be too late
unless there was evidence of insanity at
intervening periods.-Cf. White v. Graves,
107 M1ass. 325. Proof that Hastings is now,
seven years.after the making of the deed,
imbecile, can scarcely be evidence of his
imbecility then.
But, the evident object of the plaintiff is
to prove the continuance of the same type
or degree of mental feebleness from Feb. 3,
1891, to the present, in order to make available the opinion of experts as to the existence of imbecility. If an adequate description of the conduct, words, manner,
al)pearance, etc. of Hastings in February,
1891, were given,alienists might express an
opinion on his sanity or insanity, on the
hypothesis of the truth of this description.
7 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 503; First National
Bank v. Wirebach, 106 Pa. 37. Instead
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of considering such a descriptiorl, the physicians examine Hastings themselves and
form an opinion of his feebleness. The
sister proves that the same condition existed in 1891 as now; that there was then
a similar appearance, similar conduct, similar words. We think she is competent to
affirm the similarity of mental and moral
conduct in 1891 and in 1898, and that the
jury might legitimately apply to the conduct of 1891, the judgment of the experts
as to that of 1898.
As some of the evidence offered is not
admissible, we shall reject the offer.-Keeler Co. v. Schott, I Superior 458.
SARAH GRIGGS vs. PASSENGER
RAILWAY CO.
PassengerRailways-Negligence.
Trespass.
DANIEL R. REESE and MARLIN WOLF
for the plaintiff.
The conductor was negligentin allowing
passengers to ring the bell for startingand
stopping the car.-Pittsb. & Connelsville
R. R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510; Pa. R. R.
Co. v. Kilgore, 32 Pa. 2.92; Broadway &
Seventh Avenue Railway Co. v. Putnam,
55 N. Y. 108; Mulhado v. Brooklyn City
Ry. Co., 30 N. Y. 370; Spohn v. Missouri
Pacific R. R. Co., 87 Mo. 74.
By reason of plaintiffs age and condition, extra care should have been exerted
in her behalf on part of defendan t.-Cleveland R. R. Co. v. Missouri, 30 Ohio 4.51;
Hale ol Carriers, p. 522.
The negligence of the conductor is imputable to the company.-Hale oi Carriers, 523-4-5; Penna. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S.
451; Fed. St. & Pleasant Valley R. R. Co.
v. Gibson, 96 Pa. 83.
FRANK J. LAUBENSTEIN and WM. M.
FLANIGAN for the defendant.
The defendants were not negligent.-Ellinger v. Phila., Wilmington and Baltimore R. R. Co., 153 Pa. 213; Fredericks v.
Northern Central R. R. Co., 157 Pa. 103;
Ferry v. The M. R. Co., 118 N. Y. 497; Pecard v. The RidgeAve. R. Co.. 147 Pa. 195;
P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Hell, 5 W. N. C. 91;
Farley v. Phila. Traction Co., 132 Pa. 58;
Hinck v. Pittsb., Ft. Wayne and Chicago
R. R. Co., 53 Pa. 512.
A railway company is not responsible
for the acts of passengers.-Ferrv v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 118 N. Y. 497; Harrison v.
Miss. Ry. Co., 66 Miss. 419; Curtis v. R. &
S. R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 514.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On May 17, 1895, Sarah Griggs, 72 years
of age, and weighing 180 pounds, was rid-

ing in a car of defendant, in the borough
of Carlisle. In this car, which was but
20 feet long, there were 50 passengers, some
of them standing on the rear platform.
At A street the car always stopped so that
ringing the bell was omitted by the conductor. While he was collecting fares in
the car, as it was approaching A street, a
passenger on the rear platform rang it
without authority. Mrs. Griggs had told
the conductor that she wanted to alight
there. When the car stopped, he called
out A street, and nodded to her to indicate
that she should get out. Other passengers rushed out in front of her so that she
was the last to get out. When she was
stepping from the step to the ground, the
same passenger rang the bell without authority, and the car suddenly started, and
Mrs. Griggs was thrown to the ground, although the conductor, who had returned
to the platform, was about extending his
hand to assist her. Although passengers
sometimes rang the bell, it did not happen
more than 3 or 4 times a week on this ear,
although it happened rather frequently on
other cars of the defendant. Such act was
regarded as officious by this conductor.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

We are requested. gentlemen of the jury,
to instruct you that there is not sufficient
evidence of the defendants' negligence.
The Railway Company is not liable simply because there was an accident. It does
not insure the safety of its passengers. It
is bound siniply to exercise extreme care,
and is responsible only for such injuries to
passengers as result from the absence of
such care. It is its duty to furnish them
opportunities for a safe exit from its cars.
If it starts too soon, and thus causes injury
to them, it becomes liable.--Passenger Railway Co. v. Stutler, 54 Pa. 375; Pa. R. R.
Co. v. Peters, 116 Pa. 206. The evidence
amply justifies a conclusion that not a sufficient time was accorded Mrs. Griggs to
descend from the car. She was old and far
from agile. The car ought to have been
halted long enough to allow her to safely
land upon the ground. The car was started
nevertheless while she was still in the act
of descending. We think it would indisputably be for you to say whether the conductor was negligent if the agency of the
passenger had not intervened.-Mulhado
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v. Brooklyn City R. R., 30 N. Y. 370; Washington and Georgetown R. R. Co. v. Harmon, 147 IU.S. 577. The start of the car
was due primarily to the ringing of the
signal by a passenger. He rang it without
authority. His act cannot be attributed
to the company. If it was in no indirect
way responsible for the ringing and the
consequence, its exoneration would be inevitable. In-Ellingerv. P. W. &B.R. R.,
153 Pa. 213, the rude and impatient movement of a passenger boarding a car, caused
a descending passenger to fall. The company neither caused the act nor could have
prevented it, or intercepted its consequences. It was for that reason not actionable.
When, however, the company could
with care have prevented the improper
conduct of passengers, or could have, with
reasonable diligence, averted its results, it
has been held responsible for theseresults.
Thus, it is negligence to omit proper measures to suppress a fight in a car, Pittsburg,
etc. Railway v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510; Cf. Pittsburg, etc. R. R. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512; Duggan v. Baltimore and 0. R. R., 159 Pa. 248;
Putnam v. Broadway, etc. Railway Co.,
55 N. Y. 108. To have refrained from do.
ingwhat might reasonably have been done
to prevent a passenger's ringing the signal
to start, or from countermanding itin some
way might be negligence.-Nichols v.
Lynn & Boston Railroad, 168 Mass. 528.
Might the conductor, exercising proper
care, have prevented the ringing of the
bell? The same passenger had just rung
the bell as a signal to stop. Should the
conductor have requested him not to repeat
the act? Three or four times a week, the
bell of this car was rung by passengers.
Was this done with the sufferance of the
conductor? Might the failure to rebuke
and forbid such acts have led to the particular act which caused the injury to the
plaintiff? It appears that the ringing of
the bell on other cars of the defendanthappened "rather frequently." We think in
these circumstances there is enough to support a finding that the company's previous
neglect to check the habit of ringing the
bell led to the accident to Mrs. Griggs.Nichols v. Lynn & Boston Railroad, 168
Mass. 528.
The conductor was at the rear of the car
when the plaintiff was attempting to de-

seend from it. Could he have countermanded the signal tostart? Was he careless in not doingso? Did he exercise reasonable diligence and care in attempting to
avert-from the plaintiff any injury from
the start which the signal led him to expect? These questions can be answered
only by the jury, and on your answer to
them will depend the character of the verdict that you will render. We must decline
therefore to affirm the point of the defendant.
JOHN DENNISTON vs. JULIA
THOMPSON.
Conversion- Wife's chattels as collateral
securityfor husband's debt-Transfer of
ufe's chattels to surety of husband-Act
1893.
Trespass for conversion.
MILESH. MuRxI and W. LLOYD SNYDER for the plaintiff.
1. A very slight advantage to one party,
and a trifling inconvenience to the other,
is a sufficient consideration to support a
contract, when made by one of good capacity, and not under the influence of
fraud, imposition or mistake.-Harlan v.
Harlan. 20 Pa. 303; Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178
Pa. 303; Forster v.. Fuller, 6 Mass. 58;
Hubbard-v. Coleridge, 1 Neb. 84; Hind v.
Holdship, 2 Watts 104; Crombine v. McGrath. 139 Mass. 550.
2. Notwithstanding the act of 1893, P.
L. 344, a married woman may mortgage
her estate as security for her husband's
debts.-DuBois Bank v. Kuntz, 175 Pa.
432; Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa. 303; Hoffey
v. Caisey, 73 Pa 431; Kulp v. Braub, 162
Pa. 222; Brown's Appeal, 94 Pa. 362; Dandas' Appeal, 94 Pa. 76; Hagenback v.
Phillips, 112 Pa. 248; Black v. Galway, 24
Pa. 18.
3. If plaintiff is entitled to possession,
he may recover.-Hardy v. Reed, 60 Mass.
253; Morgan v. Ide, 8 Cush. 450.
FRANK H. STROuSS and JACKSON ORLANDO RAAS for the defendant.
1. The plaintiff has no title. There was
no consideration to enforce the contract.Cobb v. Page, 17 Pa. 469; Dunbar v.
Flusher, 137 Pa. 85; Clark v. Russell, 3
Watts 213. Allowing the defendant to retain possession is no consideration.-Fink
v. Smith, 170 Pa. 124; L'Amoreaux v.
Gould, 7 N. Y. 349; White v. Heyman, 34
Pa. 142; Crashy v. Wood, 6 N. Y. 370.
2. Statutes of Frauds requires a writing.
-1 P. & L. Dig. Pa. 2194.
3. Contract is prohibited by act of June
8, 1893. A married woman cannot become
surety for her husband.-2 P. & L. Dig.
Pa. 2890; Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa. 203;
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Lutchens v. Paris, 19 Phila. 374; Bunting's

Estate, 5 C. C. 623.

4. There is no valid gift for want of delivery.-Scott v. Lauman, 104 Pa. 593;
Kidder v. Kidder, 33 Pa. 268; Zimmerman
v. Strelper, 75 Pa. 147.
5. Plaintiff must. have right to immediate possession to recover.-loorehead v.
Scofield, 111 Pa. 584; Duffield v. Miller, 92
Pa. 286; Newhall v. Kingsbury, 131 Mass.
445.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE,
Charles Thompson, husband of Julia,
was indebted to several persons on notes,
on which Denniston was surety, and also
to his wife for $1,000. He assigned personal property, horses, wagons, agricultural implements, worth $1,000, to his wife
in satisfaction of the debt owed to her.
She thereupon made a contract with Denniston, in which she transferred these
goods to him as security against his liability on the Charles Thompson notes. He
allowed her to retain the goods, however,
in order to carry on the farming. Subsequently she advertised a publiesale of these
goods.
Denniston, attending the sale,
gave notice that the goods were his. The
sale, nevertheless, proceeded, and the
goods were bought by sundry persons.
Denniston then brought this action of
trover against Julia Thompson.
OPINIO0 OF THE COURT.
The personal property, formerly of Chas.
Thompson, became, by his assignment to
her, the property of his wife. She then
transferred it to Denniston, not in gift,
not in sale, but as a collateral security. As the chattels continued in her
possession, such a transfer would not have
been valid as against execution creditors
of or purchasers from her, who were not
aware of the transfer. It would not be invalid because of this retention of possession, as between Denniston and Julia
Thompson.-Tiedeman, Sales, 344, 395;
Bismark Building Association v. Bolster,
92 Pa. 123.
But, Julia Thompson was a married
woman, and she assigned these chattels,
not to pay or to secure the payment of her
own debt, but to protect Denniston from
liability for her husband. Did her coverture make the assignment void? At common law the distinction was taken between a contract by a feme covert to pay
and an actual payment; between a con-

tract to transfer money, etc., and an actual
transfer thereof. A payment of money, or
a transfer of ai chose in action, by her, was
valid, if made with the consent of husband. She could give chattels to the husband, or, with his consent, to another.Gutshall v. Goodyear, 107 Pa. 123; Hinny
v. Phillips, 50 Pa 382; Mann's Appeal, 50
Pa. 375. She could give a policy of life insurance, with his consent, to another.Bond v. Bunting, 78 Pa. 210. Having a
testamentamy charge on land which her
husband has acquired, she might give the
money represented by it to him by a release.-Powell's Appeal, 98 Pa. 403. [The
release was held null here because a gift
was not intended.] With her husband's
assent, she could transfer shares of stock to
a brother, to enable him to obtain a loan
upon it as security.-Souder v. Columbia
National Bank, 156 Pa. 374; Cf. Hinkle v.
Landis, 131 Pa. 573; Brown v. Niethammer, 141 Pa. 114; TLeiper's Appeal, 108 Pa.
377. Under late legislation the consent of
the husband is not necessary. Even at
common law, then, the coverture of Mrs.
Thompson would not have avoided the
transfer of her chattels to Denniston gratuitously, or by way of absolute sale.
At common law the wife could mortgage
her land in order to secure the repayment
of a debt of her husband or of another; 3
Liens 115; Hagenbach v. Phillips, 112 Pa.
284; Citizens' Saving Asso. v. Heiser, 150
Pa. 514; Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa,. 303; Du
Bois Deposit Bank v. Kuntz, 175 Pa. 432.
She could transfer a U. S. bond owned by
her, Selden v. Nat. Bank of Meadville, 69
Pa. 424; shares of stock or chattels for the
same purpose, Dando's Appeal, 94 Pa. 76.
The second section of the act of Juite 8,
1893, 2 P. & L. 2890, after declaring that a
married woman may '-make any contract
in writing or otherwise" etc., adds, "but
she may not become aecommodation indorser, maker, guarantor or surety for
another." Iftransferringproperty, real or
personal, to secure the debt of another, is
becoming surety, then this clause prohibits
mortgages, whether of land or chattels, by
a married woman, for that object, and in
Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa., 303, it is said by
Mitchell J. that it might well have been
held that a mortgage by a married woman
to secure her husband's debt is in substance
a contract of suretyship, which she was
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not, at common law, capable of mkting."
In Weigle v. Mercer, 1 Superior 490, where
a married woman transferred to a surety
of her husband, to protect him from liability, a judgment owned by her, on which
an execution was issued, and it was agreed
that the surety should buy in the goods of
the defendant and hold them "solely as
collateral security," it was held by the
court that it should not lend its-aid to the
surety to regain the possession of the goods
which the assignor, the wife, had in her
hands, because of the clause of the act of
1893 supra. Nevertheless, the right of
every owner to convey his or her estate is
held to include the right to convey land,
178 Pa. 303, or a chose in action, Kulp v.
Brant, 162 Pa. 222, by way of mortgage for
any purposes, and inter alia, for the purpose of securing the husband's debt. To
make herself personally liable for another's
debt would be for the wife to become surety.
She does not become surety when she
makes some specific property liable for such
debt.
But in all the cases that we have examined in which the wife's mortgage of chattels or land has been recognized as binding,
there has been a consideration for it. The
debt has been created simultaneously with
the mortgage, or the mortgage has postponed the period of its payment. Denniston was already a surety when he received
the transfer from Mrs. Thompson, and he
in no way increased his burdens in accept.
ing it. He in no sense has furnished any
consideration for the transfer. Does this
prevent his asserting a right to the chattels? In White's Appeal, 36 Pa. 134, a
wife assigned her interest in her father's
estate to one, already a creditor of her husband, who gave no consideration for the
assignment. The wife subsequently repossessed herself of the assignment without his consent. The orphans' court, in
distributing the father's estate, declined to
award any of it to the creditor because
there was not "any act or consideration to
constitute an equity." In Weigle v. Mercer, supra, although one of the grounds
for refusing to compel the wife to permit
her assignee to take the chattels that he
hadpurchased atthe sherift's sale by means
of the judgment assigned to him, was that
the contract was one of suretyship-aposition which is untenable-another ground

was that the assignee was such "through
an executory contract without consideration or merit." It is difficult to see why,
if a wife can part with her entire title in
land or chattel, by way of gift, she may not
give so much of it as may be necessary to
realize a certain sum of money on a contingency. A gratuitous transfer of a chattel
as a collateral security is precisely such a
gift. Nor can it be said that the gift to
Dennison was only executory. An executory gift is not a gift, but an intention or
a promise to give. But, when does the
promise to give become a gift? The delivery of a deed for land, wfth the intention
properly expressed in the deed that the
ownership shall at once pass is, if gratuitous, an executed gift. The delivery of a
paper purporting to be an assignment of a
right to receive money on a life insurance
policy is an executed gift of the right, although the policy itself is retained by the
donor.-Bond v. Bunting, 78 Pa. 210. The
gift of the chattels by Mrs. Thompson to
Dennison, to be used by the latter as a
source of indemnification should he have
to pay the notes on which he was surety,
was complete. But, so was the gift in
White's Appeal, supa, and so seems it to
have been in Weigle v. Mercer, supra.
Denniston '"allowed" Mrs. Thompson to
retain the goods "in order to carry on the
farming." When she sold them, she violatedthe conditionon which sheheld them.
The mere act of sale was a conversion.
No demand for the return of them was
necessary before instituting the action.
The right to retain them was lost by the
sale. There would have been then, in the
plaintiff, a right to the possession, and a
special property, had the assignment to
him been valid. A new trial will be
granted.
ALVA HAZLITT vs. WM. ECARPER.
Partnership debt-Execution against a
member-Levy onfirm property-Subsequent execution againstfirm-Sale.
Distribution of fund from sheriff's sale.
A. FRANR JOHN and LLEWELLYN HiLDRaETH for the plaintiff.
1. Partnership property can be levied
upon and sold under an execution against
an individual member of the firm, where
the execution is for a firm debt, and upon
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the distribution of the money paid into
court it is competent for a creditor to show
that an execution against individuals was
for a partnership debt and that the debtors were members of the same partnership.
-Franklin v. Morris, 154 Pa. 152; In re
McHose Fund, 10 Montg. 47; Boyd v.
Thompson & Coxe, 153 Pa. 78; Union Pottery Co. v. Ginder, 2 Lancaster 345; Grier
& Co. v. Hood, 25 Pa. 430; Urey v. Bair, 5
York 195; Gerard v. Basse, 1 Dallas 119;
Ross v. Howell, 84 Pa. 129; Paxon v.
Beans, 3 Phila. 438; Harper v. Fox, 7 W.
&S. 142.
2. Executions delivered to the sheriff
must be paid out of the prceeds of sale of
personal property in the order in which
they came into the sheriff's hands.-TayJor v. Fitzsimmons 17 S. & R. 457; Ulrieh
v. Dreyer. 2 Watts 303; Shaffner v. Gilmore, 3 W. & S. 438.
E AiSAULSBURY and SAMUEL H. MrLLER for JamesWhite and Harper & Bro.
1. A judgment note given by Win. Harper without the consent of his partner cannot bind the latter or the firm.-James v.
Vanzandt, 163 Pa. 171; McNoughton's Appeal, 101 Pa. 550; Walker v. Nat. Bank, 98
Pa. 574; Coffin's Appeal, 106 Pa. 280;
Brightley's Dig., Vol. 4, Part 2, p. 4264; 37
Mich. 236; Bitzer v. Shunk, 1 W. & S. 340.
2. Where there is aft. fa. against a firm,
and an olderfi.fa. against one of the partners, the proceeds of a sale of partnership
property must be applied to the ft. fa.
against the firm.-Coover's Appeal, 29 Pa.
1; Miller v. Miller, 3 Pa. 540; Cope's Appeal, 39 Pa. 284.
3. John White had no notice that Hazlitt'sjudgment was for a firm debt, and,
therefore, he must have priority.-Haunilton's Appeal, 103 Pa. 368.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William and John Harper, trading as
Harper & Bro., were in partnership, and,
on May 3, 1896, contracted a debr to Hazlitt for goods sold. Six months afterwards
William Harper gave his own note for the
amount, $350, with a warrant of attorney
to confess, on which judgment was entered
against him. On this judgment afi.fa.
was issued May 13, 1897, on which the
goods of the firm were, on the same day,
levied on. On May 14th James White, a
creditor of the firm, having a judgment for
$1,500 against it, issued an execution,
which was likewise levied on the same
goods. The sheriff made sale, at which
$1,750 were bid. Hazlitt insists that the
net proceeds, $1,700, be applied to his judgment until it is paid in full. White contends that his judgment must be first paid,
and Harper & Bro. that Hazlitt should not
be paid anything.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The execution of Hazlitt first reached
the sheriff's hands, and would therefore
have precedence to the White execution,
were the goods levied on equally liable to
seizure under both executions.-3 Liens,
499.
The goods levied on belonged to the firm
of Harper & Bro. The debt represented
by the White judgment was a firm debt;
the judgment and the f. fa. were against
the firm. It is useless to cite authorities
for the principle that these goods could
properly be levied on and sold for the satisfaction of that judgment.
The Hazlitt judgment is founded oi a
note executed by William Harper, and a
warrant of attorney, thereto attached, to
confess judgment against him. Ti judgment is against him, and not against Harper & Bro. Had it been ajudgment against
Harper & Bro., though confessed by him
alone, it could have been executed against
the firm property, if it. in fact represented
a firm debt.-McCleery v. Thompson, 130
Pa. 443; Boyd v. Thompson, 153 Pa. 78;
Franklin v. Morris, 154 Pa. 152; McNoughton's Appeal, 101 Pa. 550; Hamilton's Appeal, 103 Pa. 368; Corson v. Beans, 3 Phila.
438; White v. Rech, 171 Pa. 82; Ross v.
Howell, 84 Pa. 129; Union Pottery Co. v.
Ginder, 2 Lane. 345. On the other hand,
had the judgment been against William
Harper and John Harper, and not against
Harper & Bro., on proof that the debt represented by it was a firm debt, firm assets
could be sold on theft.fa. issued upon it.
-Snodgrass' Appeal, 13 Pa. 471; In re MeHose Fund, 10 'Mont. 47. The judgment
on which the Hazlitt execution issued is
against William Harper only, not against
William Harper and John Harper, and
not against Harper & Bro. Can it be satisfied out of the firm assets?
Ordinarily, on a judgment against a
member of the firm, the firm assets specifically cannot be sold, but only the interest
of the member.-Dengler's Appeal, 125 Pa.
12; Taylor v. Henderson, 17 S. & R. 453;
Smith v. Emerson, 43 Pa. 456; Durborrow's
Appeal, 84 Pa. 404; White v. Rech, 171
Pa. 82. The partners have an equity that
the firm assets shall be applied to the payment of the joint debts, and to their reimbursement for advances they may have
made to the business in excess of those
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made by the defendant. It distinctly appears, however, that the $350, for which
the Hazlitt judgment was confessed, were
due to Hazlitt for goods sold by him to the
partnership. Does this warrant a seizure
and sale on it of the partnership assets?
If the record of the action in which the
judgment is recovered shows that the debt
is a partnership debt, firm property may
be levied on, on the ft. fa. issued upon it.
Thus,*if, in action against four partners on
a firm note, one of the partners does not
appear, and a trial is had on the issue
made by the others, on the judgment recovered against the others, the partnership
assets can be levied on.-Taylor v. Henderson, 17 S. & R. 453. The judgment is an
adjudication that the debt is a partnership
debt. although it is a judgment against
only some of the partneis. The Hazlitt
judgment is entered on a note and a warrant of attorney, which shows that the
debt is the debt, not of Harper & Bro., but
of William Harper. Such a judgment
could be authority to sell nothing but William Harper's property, not the firm property, but only his interest therein. It is
entirely clear that the assets of the partnership could not be legally sold on this judgment. The $350 may be a firm debt. As
sudh, it has not yet been reduced to judgment. William Harper has made himself
individually liable for it, and the judgment is simply an adjudication of the individual liability. The sale on this judgnient alone would not have divested the
ownership of the firm.-White v. Rech,
171 Pa. 82; Stevens v. Diehl, 127 Pa. 416.
It follows that, as the proceeds represent
the value of the firm property, they must
be applied to the judgment of Jas. White.
It likewise follows that the balance belongs to Harper & Bro. No definite aliquot part of it belongs to Wm.'Harper. It
may be that there are other debts which
John Harper has a right to pay thereout.
It may be that the firm is indebted to him
for contributions to it in excess of his share.
The balance will therefore be paid to John
Harper.
The auditor's report is therefore recommitted to him, in order that he may rec
tify it.

THIEL'S ESTATE.
Advancement-Loan by Executor-Debts
due an estate by heir-Rights of heir's
judgment creditors.
RALPH H. LIGHT and CHARLES S.
SHALTERS in support of the claim of Tome
and Smiles.
Advancement is always a question of intention. 2 Williams on Executors, 8f2;
Intestates act of 1833. When the testator
holds a note against the legatees, the presumption is that it is a debt.-EState of
Eisenbeg, 180 Pa. 125; Miller'sAppeal, 107
Pa. 221; %ewee's Estate, 7 Phila. 498.
The executrix is primarily liable to the
estate for the loan to the legatee.-Wilson's
Appeal, 115 Pa. 95; Nyce's Estate, 5 W. &
S. 254; Robins' Estate, 180 Pa. 630. The
position of the executrix is that of an ordinaiw creditor whose equity is inferior to
that Qf the judgment creditors.-Estate of
James Cooper, 4 S. C. R. 615; Carter's Appeal, 10 Pa. 144; Siegfrie.'s Estate, 1 Woodward 77.
HARRY M. PERSING and ARTHUR M.
DEVALL contra.
The heir is a debtor to the estate and his
debts must be deducted from his share before his other creditors can claim anything.
Dickinson's Estate, 148 Pa. 142; Manifold's
Estate, 5 W. & S. 340.
The Orphans' Court has no jurisdiction
in cases of creditors' claims against legatees.-Ottinger's Estate, 17 C. C. 244; Carter's Appeal, 10 Pa. 144; Ditsche's Estate,
13 Phila. 288; Robinson's Estate, 12 Phila.
170. An executor may loan money belonging to the estate of the decedent.Webster v. Spencer, 3 B. & A. 360.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

John Thiel died, leaving a widow and
four sons, and property, both real and personal, to the value of $150,000. He made
his widow executrix and authorized her to
manage the estate until the majority of
his youngest son, who at his death was
13 years old. In his will he charged as an
ad vancement $15,000 which he had loaned
on a single bill to his oldest son, William.
After the will was written, he let William
have an additional sum of $2,000, for which
he took a judgment note. The will authorized the widow, as executrix, to pay any
one of the children, in her -discretion, his
estimated share before the majority of the
youngest. The widow lent $5,000 to William, taking his bond therefor, in which
she, as executrix of the estate, is named as
obligee. William became unfortunate in
business and contracted debts for which
judgments were recovered, one for$4,000 by
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Amos Tome, and another the same day for
$5,000"by Samuel Smiles. Under a power
in the will, the executrix sold the test-tor's
real estate for $60,000, of which, as widow,
she was entitled during life to the interest
on $20,000. The personalty had been divided among the children, William's advancement of $15,000 being deducted from
his share, before the recovery of the Tome
and Smiles judgments. Tome and Smiles
claim $9,000 as the share of William. The
brothers insist that the $2,000 debt of William, and the loan from the widow as executrix be first paid.
No complaint is made of the deduction
of $15,000 from William's share of the personalty. Originally a debt, this sum was
converted by the testator's will into an advancement.-Snider v. Snider, 149 Pa. 362;
Patterson's Appeal, 128 Pa. .269. As however it does not appear that the statute of
limitations or any other impediment would
have prevented the collection of it as a debt
it is unimportant whether it be considered
as a debt or as an advancement.
The testator loaned $2,000 to William,
taking a note for it. This sum is a debt.
In the making of distribution of a decedent's estate, any debts owing to it by a
legatee or distributee are to be treated as a
part of the estate, and the debtor is to be
considered as having rceived pro tanto
his portion. The sum of $2,000 must then
be added to the $40,000, in order to ascertain the estate for distribution, and of his
share William must be regarded as having
received so much. - Morr's Appcal, 80 Pa.
427; Springer's Appeal, 29 Pa. 208; Harman's Estate, 135 Pa. 441; Eisenbrey's Estate, 180 Pa. 125.
Two judgments have been recovered
against William. Whether they are liens
or not depends on his having had, at the
moment of their recovery, an interest in
land. The will imparts a power to sell the
land to the executrix. Unfortunatey, we
are not informed whether it was merely a
power, in whose exercise the testatrix had
a free discretion, or whether it was accompanied with a peremptory direction to sell.
If it was a bare power, the sons had an
estate in the land until its exercise; and
thejudgments against William became 4
lien on his interest -Caldwell v. Snyder,
178 Pa. 420; Sheridan v. Sheridan, 136 Pa.
14; Peterson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 397; Darling-

ton v. Darlington, 160 Pa. 65; 3 Liens, 264;
and, as such, entitled to take what he
should have otherwise received. If it was
a power coupled with an absolute direction
to sell, the interests of the distributees
were personalty, and not therefore bound
by the judgments.-1 Liens, 221; 3 Liens,
262.
Let us assume, for the present, that the
power was discretionary, and, therefore,
that the Tome and Smiles judgments became liens on William's share. It would
still be necessary to ascertain what that
share is. It would be one-fourth, but for
his debts. His debts, we have seen, must
be treated as advanced payments to him.
The fact that judgments have been recovered does not change the principle of distribution. The lien will attach only to
the actual share of William, after the deduction of his debt to the estate.-Dickinson's Estate,148 Pa. 142; Manifold's Estate,
5 V. & S. 340. The share of William will
therefore be less by $2,000, and interest,
were there any on it due, than it would
have been had he not owed the debt.
The will required a distribution of the
estate when the youngest son should attain his majority. But it authorized an
earlier distribution in the discretion of the
executrix. She could, under this power,
have given to a son the whole of his share
in all the estate, except that in which she
had a life interest, or any part thereof.
She has in fact given $5,000 to William.
But, she did not take his receipt for it, as
a part of the estate. She took, rather, his
bond, by which he bound himself to repay
to her the money then received by him.
It has been frequently held that a father's
taking notes or bonds from his children
excludes the supposition that the moneys
paid to them were an advancement, unless
there is other evidence.-Dotyv. Doty, 155
Pa. 285; Potts' Appeal, 10 Atlan. 887;
High's Appeal, 21 Pa. 283; Miller's Appeal,
40 Pa. 57; Roland v. Schrack, 29 Pa. 125;
Miller's Appeal, 107 Pa. 221. The taking
of this bond would indicate a loan and not
an advancement.
But, the bond names Mrs. Thiel obligee
"as executrix of theestate." Shehadthe
power to advance. She had no right tdlend
the moneys of the estate on purely personal
security. We think the inference permissiblethat the $5,000 weregiven to William

THE FORUM.
in the exercise of the discretion to advance.
But, let us suppose that the money was a
loan. The form of the bond justifies the
inference that it was a loan of money held
by the lender as executrix of her husband's
estate; that is. it was a loan of a portion of
the assets. At the thne this loan was
made, so far as appears, the judgments of
Tome and Stiles had not been recovered.
It was necessary for them to inquire concerning debts to oradvancements from the
testator in his lifetime, if they desired to
ascertain to what extent the lien of the
judgments would be available. We see no
reason why they should not be required
to include in their inquiry debts to the
estate afterwards. The distribution of an
estate.proceeds on equitable principles.Dickinson's Estate, 148 Pa. 142. It would
be inequitable to allow William to take as
large a portion of the fund as if he had not
borrowed $5,000 from it. This equity is as
valid against those who have acquired
liens on his share since it came into existence as against himself. Secret equities
are valid as against judgment creditors.
The cash in hand for distribution is ............................... $40,000 00
7,000 00
William's debt is ....................
$47,000
Total ................................
$11,750
The share of each is ..........
$11,7 0
Payable to John ..........
11,750
Payable to Charles ................
11,750
Payable to Henry,. ................
4,750
Payable to William ................

00
00
00
00
00
00

$40,000 00
As the judgments against William were
recovered on the same day, they must be
paid ratably.
To Tome, four-ninths of $4,750,
$2,111 10
or, ......................................
To Smiles,five-ninths of$4,750,
2,638 90
..................
or ..........
The exceptions to the auditor's report
are sustained, and a decree will be drawn
up in conformity with this opinion.
JOHN MEYER vs. CHARLES
LITTELL.
Slander-Imputationof crime--Privileged
CommunicationS.
Trespass.
DR. JOHN C. D. DAvis and Gxo. L.
SCHUYLER for plaintiff.

The words of the defendant are actionable per se.-Act of 1860, B. Purd. Dig. 475;
Bigelow on Torts, 41. The words are none
the less actionable because of the expression
of belief.-Dottarer v. Bushey, 16 Pa. 204:
Beehler v. Steever, 2 Wh. 313; Lukehart'
v. B.yerly, 53 Pa. 418. Tie statement of
the defendant was made without justification.-Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385; Kellogg
against Carv, 3 P. & IV. 102; Farley v.
Ranch, 3 W. & S. 554; Stitzell v. Reynolds
and Wife, 67 Pa. 54.FRANK B. SELLERS and B. FRANK
FENTON for defendant.
The words are not actionableper se.-13
Am. & Eng. Ency. 353. *They express a
mere suspicion.-Odgers on Libel and Slander, 44; Folkard's Starkie on Libel and
Slander, 145; Brettun v. Anthony, 103
Mass. 37.
The communication is a qualified privileged one.-Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y.
373. The contract is uberimae fidei.Richards on Insurance, p. 8; Clark on Cont.
316.
The statement was made with justification.-2 Greenleaf on Ev. 418; 13 Am.&
Eng. Encyc. 413-416; Odgers on Libel and
Slander, p. 159; Pollock on Torts, p. 177;
Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Meyer rented a farm from Littell "on the
shares." While the grain was in the barn,
Meyer obtained an insurance on his stock,
his farming implements, and such of the
contents of the barn as were his, and Littell procured an insurance on the barn and
his share of its contents. The barn was
consumed by fire and both Meyer and Littell received the amount of their policies.
After the fire, Meyer remained on the premises as tenant, and Littell applied to the
agent of the same insurance company for
insurance on the other buildings on the
farm. In the course of his conversation,
Littell told the agent that he "believed the
The agent replied
barn was set on fire.'
that "if he, Littell, thought there was danger of the other buildings being set on fire,
the company would not take the risk."
Littell replied that he did not know about
future danger, but that the bad financial
circumstances of the tenant Meyer, his
having just previously to the fire been given notice to quit by Littell and the fact of
his having had everything he could possibly claim insured for more than its full
value, "made the burning of the barn look
suspicious.,
The only plea entered by*the defendant
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is "not guilty." As, when defamatory
words are spoken, they are presumed to be
untrue, until their truth is established, 13
Am. & Eng. Encyc. 395, and as proof of
their truth is not admissible under the plea
of not guilty, Peters v. Ulmer, 74 Pa. 402;
Minnesinger v. Kerr, 9 Pa. 312; Petric v.
Rose, 5 W. & S. 364; Townshend, Slander
and Libel, 591, all the defamatory words
imputed by the declaration to the defendant must be assumed to be false. This however is not equivalent to saying that the
circumstances enumerated by Littell,
which are not slanderous, but which are
assigned by him as the cause of his suspicion, are to be conclusively presumed to be
untrue.
The alleged libel consists in the imputation to Meyer of the burning of the barn of
Littell and of his own personal property,
for the purpose of defrauding the insurance
company. To burn the barn of another is
felonious arson ; 1 P. & L. 1104, if it be parcel of a dwelling. To burn it, if not parcel
of a dwelling, is to commit amisdemeanor,
1 P. & L. 1105; Staeger v. Commonwealth,
103 Pa. 4,S9. Whether a tenant in possession, if he burns the barn, burns the barn
of "another," in the sense of this statute it
is unnecessary to decide, 1 Wh. Crim. Law
697 (9 Edit.) The 139th section of the act
of March 31, 1860, 1 P. & L. 1106, declares
the setting fire by any owner, tenant or
occupant to any house, barn or other building "with an intention thereby to defraud
or prejudice any person, or body politic or
corporate, that hath underwritten or shall
underwrite any policy of insurance thereon" shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
punished by a fine and imprisonment by
separate and solitary confinement at labor.
It is clear then that if the words used by
the defendant import a charge of such burning, they are a slander, and actionable
without proof of damage. They would attribute to the plaintiff (1) an offence which
is indictable and (2) subject to infamous
punishment.-Davis v. Carey, 141 Pa. 314;
Andres v. Kopenhaefer, 3 S. & R. 257; 13
Am. & Eng. Encyc. 347.
But, the language of Littell does not affirm of Meyer that he set fire to the barn
with intent to defraud. It alleges (1) that,
in Littell's opinion, the barn was set on
fire. This alone would not be slanderous,
for it does not accuse any particular per-

son, and hence, not Meyer; 13 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 386, 391; Odgers, Libel and Slander.
98. Bdt, it further suggests (2) that certain facts concerning Meyer make the
burning of the barn look suspicious. In
substance Littell, says that certain facts
exist, and that these facts make the suspicion that Meyer set fire to the barn, reasonable. A suspicion may be without adequate objective basis. To say that facts
make the burning look suspicious is to say
that they warrant a suspicion.
But, are the enumeration of facts, and
the declaration that these facts warrant a
suspicion that a certain undisputed burning was caused by a certain person a slander? In the majority of cases, when one
says that another stole, or robbed, or committed forgery or arson, he is merely expressing his conviction or belief founded on
circumstances that in his opinion justify
it. He is not understood to affirm that
which h edirectly knows. He nevertheless
utters a slander. So, if instead of expressing himself objectively, as, by saying that
X stole, he speaks subjectively, as by saying, "I believe that X stole," he is none
the less guilty of a slander.-Dottarer v.
Bushey, 16 Pa. 204; Beehler v. Steever, 2
Wh. 313; Towushend, Slander and Libel,
174. Would he be the less guilty if at the
same time he enumerated facts and stated
that it was they that induced him to entertain this belief? If he states that he
makes the assertion on the authority of a
specified person, he does not excuse himself, Kennedy y. Gregory, 1 Binn. 85;

Hersh v. Ringwalt, 3 Y. 508; Townshend,
Slander & Libel, 306, and it is impossible
to see how the naming of facts as the
source of his inference could make the expression of the inference not actionable.
In McKennon v. Greer, 2 W. 352 and Bornman v. Boyer, 3 Binn. 515, the fact was
mentioned which the defendant supposed
to support the accusation, but he was guilty
of slander.
Now, does a defendant commit a slander when he connects the plaintiff with a
crime, in the imagination of his hearer,
and, in addition, shows that he believes
the connection, and does he commit no
slander if, connecting the plaintiff with
the crime, he shows that he has only a
suspicion? Is the presence of actionable
damage to reputation dependent on the

THE FOUJM.
degree of credence expressed by the defendant? It can be hardly legs injurious
to a man for a statement to be made,
showing that in thesuspicionofthespeaker
he has committed a crime, than for one to
be nmade showing that, in his opinion or
belief, he has committed it. There are
authorities which hold, that when the
speaker "uses words that merely disclose
a suspicion that is in his mind," no action
would lie without proof of special damage.
-13 Am. & Eng.Encyc. 353; Townshend,
Slander, 173. Other cases hold contrariwise. --Sturton v. Chaffin, Moore, 142;
Drunnond v. Leslie, 5 Blagks. (Ind.) 453;
13 Am. & Eng. Eucyc. 390. The effect of
the language of Littell was to lodge in the
mind of the insurance agent a suspicion
that Meyer had committed a crime, and
this effect it must have been intended to
produce. We think it slanderous, unless
it was privileged.
Littell applied for insurance of buildings
on the farm on which the barn had been
recently burnt. That occurrence became
naturally a topic of inquiry. Littell explained the fire by saying that it was the
work of an incendiary.
The agent expressed fear that other incendiary fires
might destroy the buildings on which the
insurance was solicited. The statement
that followed may have been made for the
purpose of suggesting that a repetition of
the fire need not be expected because of the
removal of the tenant, or it may have
been made in order to candidly reveal to
the
agent the continuance of the
danger.
The jury was warranted in
finding that one or
the other of
these purposes induced the remarks of
Littell. At the trial we instructed the
jury that if the words of Littell were uttered to an agent, from whom insurance
was solicited, in answer to inquiries from
him concerning the danger of a repetition
of the fire, they were privileged, unless
made without belief of their truth, or maliciously. In this we discover no error.13 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 412; Townshend,
Slander and Libel, 401; Brockerman v.
Keyser, 1 Phil. 243. When the facts are
established, whether they do or do not
constitute a privilege is to be determined
by the court.-Odgers, Libel, 139.
There was no dispute as to the utterance
of the words charged to have been used by

Littell. The verdict for the defendant
presupposes, under the instruction of the
court to the jury, that the jury found that
the words were used bonafide, on the belief.that they were germane to the business with the insurance agent; and that
they were in fact germane. We see no
error in the trial, and the motion for a new
trial is therefore overruled.

SAMUEL MILLER, ASSIGNEE, vs.
HENRY MAo MILLON.
Partnershipsettlerant.-Liquidatingpartner-Partnershil)lien-Partner'slien.
Bill in equity.
FRED C. MTiLLE and WMi. K. SHISSLEE
for the plaintiff.
1. The $3,000 owed by A, being owed by
him in the capacity of an individual,
should not be charged to his interest in the
capital stock, as against the claims of his
assignee.-Lindley on Partnership, sect.
3,54; Nichol v. Stewart, 36 Ark. 612; McCormick's Appeal, 55 Pa. 252.
The partners have a lien upon the
amount, $5,000, C's share of the capital
stock remaining unpaid, as against C's administrator.-Lindley on Partnership,
sect. 352; Payne v. Matthews, 6 Paige 19;
Deal v. -Bogue, 20 Pa. 233; Appeal of York
Co. Bank, 32 Pa. 446; Baker's Appeal, 21
Pa. 82; Walker v. Eyth, 25 Pa. 216.

TnOs. B. PEPPER and G. FANK WETZEL for the defendant.
In an accounting between co-partners,
each is entitled to charge the other with
what they have not brought in, or have
taken out more than they ought.-17 Am.
& Eng. Ency. 1213. Partners, in the absence of special agreement, are entitled to
share losses in same proportion as they
share profits.-Collyer's Law of Partnership, Vol. 1, 309; Whiteomb v. Converse,
119 M[ass. 38. The assignee has no right
to any part of the firm property.-Moddewell v. Keever, 8 W. &S. 63; Raymond
v. Schoonover, 181 Pa. 352. The assignees
of an insolvent partner must first satisfy
all that is due from their assi-nor to the
partnership.-Holderness v. 9hackles, 8
B.&0. 618. Upon a dissolution, each partner has a lien upon the partnership effects.
Snodgrass' Appeal, 13 Pa. 474; Bell v. Newman, 5 S. & R. 78; Doner v. Stauffer, 1 P.
& W. 198-203.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Henry, Thomas and George MacMillon,
three brothers, were partners, doing a general merchandise business under the name
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of MacMillon & Co. The capital stock was
$30,000, of which each subscribed the sum
of $I0,000, and the partners have equal interests. Henry and Thomas have paid in
the $10,000 subscribed by them. George
has paid in $5,000, and given his promissory notes to the firm for the balance of
his subscription, payable in equal parts, in
one, two, three, four and five years, with
interest. Thomas purchased from the firm,
individually, goods amounting to $3,000.
He becomes insolvent, and makes an assignment of his property for the benefit of
creditors to Samuel Miller. George has
died. Henry is the liquidating partner,
and, as such, has disposed of all the firm
assets, and has in his hands $13,470. The
still unpaid debts of the firm are $9,470.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The principle is not very recondite
which will determine the rights of these
partners inter sese. They held equal
shares, and were equal partners. They
were to share the profits and bear the losses
equally. Henry has put $10,000 into the
business, and retracted none of it. Thomas
having paid in $10,000 has withdrawn
$3,000. George has paid in only $5,000.
The assets are $18,470. The unpaid debts,
$9,470. These must be paid, and the liquidating partner has a right to pay them.
There will remain $4,000. Of this sum,
$3,000 should be paid to Henry. Henry
and Thomas will then have made an equal
contribution. The remaining$1,000should
be divided equally between them. They
will still have contributed, each, $1,500
more than George. George then should
contribute $1,000, $500 to Henry and $500
to Thomas. What each is entitled to
charge on account with the others, including whatever each has brought in, whether
as capital or as advances, and what each
should have brought in but has not done
so, and what each one has taken out more
than he ought, should then be ascertained,
and the profits to be divided or the losses
to be made good should be apportioned,
ascertaining what each must pay to the
others in order to settle all cross-claims,
the capital being required to be first divided and repaid to the party contributing
it before before dividing, and in order to
ascertain the amount of profits.-17 Am.
& Eng. Eneyc. 1197. Each partner has

an equitable right or lien to compel the
application of the assets to the joint debts,
and for the recovery of the surplus due to
each after the settlement of the liabilities.
-17 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1197.
It was suggested at the argument that
the $3,000 withdrawn from the firm by
Thomas are a debt to the firm, and that
I he firm should claim ratably with other
creditors against his assigned estate, but
that it cannot secure to itself a preference,
by setting off his share in the assets of the
firm against his indeltedness to it. But,
this is a right which the firm has, or the
other members of it, from the very relation
of partners. Had Thomas not made an
assignment for the benefit of his creditors,
he surely could not have taken any portion of the firm assets without accounting
for what he had already withdrawn. A
debtor to A, who has counter-claims
against A when A makes an assignment,
may set off these counter-claims against
the debt when the assignee attempts to
collect it.-Trickett, Assignments, 26, 27;
Farmers' D. N. Bank v. Penn Bank, 123
Pa. 283. At the instant of Thomas MacMillon's assignment his partners had a
right to deduct so much of his share in the
assets as would be necessary to reimburme
the firm. The assignee for creditors is not
a purchaser for value, and he has no larger
right than his assignor.-Trickett, Assignments, 127. The assignee for creditors of
a partner acquires no interest in the property of the firm, in specie, but only to a
share of the residium, after the accounts
have been settled.-Raymond v. Schoonover, 181 Pa. 3.52; Holderness v. Shackel.,
8 B. & C.. 617: Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. 76;
Deal v. Bogue, 20 Pa. 228; Doner v. Stauffer, 1 P. & W. 198.
The fund in the hands of the liquidating
partner will be distributed thus:
The fund .................................... $13,470
Pay the debts therefrom .............
9,470

Balance for distribution among
partners .............................
Deduct and pay to
Henry ............. $3,000
Deduct and pay to
Henry,...........
500
$3,500
Deductandpay to Thomas,
500

$4,000

4,000
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$3,500
500
Henry's final contribution,

Henry's net contribution,
Thomas has contributed,.. $10,000
He has received,.. $3,000
500
He now receives,..
3,500

$6,500

Thomas' net contribution,

$6,500

George has contributed,...
George must contribute :

To Henry, ...........
To Thomas ........

$5,000

$500
500
1,000

$6,000

George's final contribution,

Henry has contributed,.... $10,000
3,500
He receives .....................

$6,000

$6,500
Thomas' final contribution, ............................

500

$6,000
Let a decree be drawn up in conformity
with this opinion.

RON. WILLIAM B. HORNBLOWER.

